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Abstract
The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle has been recently included among
the six major puzzles of international economics. It is a paradox that
belongs to the large group of home biases that have become stylized
facts. We investigate the F-H puzzle according to di¤erent de…nitions
of Europe and by introducing a more suitable investment variable that
results after netting out FDI. We …nd that the F-H co¢cient decreases
in all cases in whcih we adopt the correct investment de…nition. Over
time we see a decrease of the F-H coe¢cient during the 1980’s and
an increase over the 1990’s as a proof that the Maastricht Treaty
discipline has made current account targeting biting. This does not
happen for opting out and Eastern Europe countries.
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1 Introduction
Despite a huge amount of literature on the topic, the puzzle discovered more
than twenty years ago by Feldstein and Horioka (F-H) (Feldstein and Ho-
rioka, 1980), and later re…ned, (Feldstein, 1983; Feldstein and Bacchetta,
1991) remains rather an open question. What they …nd is an empirical close
relationship between domestic saving and investment in a cross section analy-
sis based on averages of gross saving and gross investment ratios on GDP,
calculated over the period 1960-1976. On a sample of 16 OECD countries
the result is that some 85-95% of national saving is invested at home, or that
domestic saving is an almost sure determinant of investment.
The question raised in the F-H puzzle is part of the broader issue of inter-
national capital mobility, that may be viewed also through di¤erent lenses.
Indeed, testing the dependence of investment on domestic saving is not the
unique way to assess …nancial markets openess. International di¤erences
in real interest rates, low correlation of consumption among countries, un-
exploited opportunities for international diversi…cation of portfolios provide
further stylized facts (Obstfeld, 1993; Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000) that point
to a lower than expected integration of international capital markets because
of persistent domestic biases. Then, the F-H puzzle may be considered a
chapter in the big book on several home biases that are quite common in
international economics.
Most of these phenomena are related either to natural or man-made barri-
ers. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) show that the six main puzzling home biases
may be mostly explained by international transaction costs, i.e.: the costs of
trading across borders. When dealing with the F-H paradox they show that
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fairly reasonable international transaction costs put a wedge between the real
interest rate of countries with a current account surplus vis à vis countries
with a de…cit. With international transport costs, a country with a current
account de…cit has a higher real interest rate than a country with a surplus.
Empirical tests seem to con…rm this theoretical statement. This implies that
the current account is a costly way to obtain consumption smoothing, that
may be a¤ordable mostly by rich and advanced countries1. All these consid-
erations add further constraints on domestic saving and investment.
If this is the case, the main problem with the saving and investment
relationship is that they may be part of an aggregate accounting constraint
that many countries tend to match in the short run, since they shun costly
current account imbalances, mainly de…cits. This is going to make saving and
investment driven by current account targeting and therefore not free to move
according to standard allocative incentives. Then, if we take for granted a
smooth behaviour of consumption, investment and saving are liable to show
quite systematic comovents. Since most of the analyses are conducted on
cross sections using 4-5 year averages the e¤ect of current account targeting
may be even larger, since countries with temporary imbalances tend to reduce
them with appropriate macropolicies targeted over a medium time span.
Many contributions have followed the original F-H paper in subsequent
years. The resulting literature is extensive and rich. However, the main
question raised by F-H seems to remain at the center stage despite many
attempts to deny either the evidence of a close link between saving and
1More variable consumption of developing countries seems to be the corollary of this.
See Vamvakidis and Wacziarg (1998).
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investment or the low capital mobility that the resulting evidence was meant
to prove.
During the last decade there has been an increased number of contri-
butions on the issue, witnessing a keen interest on capital mobility and its
macroeconomic impact, owing to the fact that, recently, …nancial markets
underwent major transformations reducing greatly the cost of crossborder
trade in …nancial assets. Has the increased capital mobility changed, to
some extent, the empirical evidence? For some scholars the dependency of
investment on domestic saving has not vanished and remains rather an un-
settled issue (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000). Others are fairly skeptical as to the
way the evidence emerges. Jansen (1997) says that cointegration in the time
dimension of saving and investment explains the saving-investment correla-
tion discovered in cross section studies, making them rather uninformative.
However, cointegration may depend on other omitted factors, among which
low capital mobility could be overshadowed by the need to meet intertem-
poral budget constraint, i.e. current account targeting. The question of the
common endogeneity of domestic saving and investment is not just the likely
result of current account targeting but also of productivity shocks that may
raise both investment and saving. Hussein (1998) tackles this problem using
dynamic OLS (DOLS) and …nds that dynamic common endogeneity changes
the picture. The dependency of investment on domestic saving fades and
only 5 out of a sample of 23 countries con…rm the F-H paradox.
Taylor and Sarno (1997) use a VAR model to split temporary and per-
manent components in the saving and investment variables. They end up
con…rming the F-H puzzle since temporary components of the variables are
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very closely related both in the US and the UK, where they perform the test.
Their conclusion is that barriers in the capital markets of the two countries
are substantial.
Ho¤man (1999) proposes a new econometric measure of long run capital
mobility and …nds that, despite a robust matching between saving and in-
vestment, there is high mobility of capital in UK and US. In other words,
correlations of the F-H type may not be much informative. Also Jansen
and Schulze (1996) maintain that the high correlations are consistent with
capital mobility, mainly if we recognize that there is a huge amount of two
way capital ‡ows, making a high correlation between saving and investment
a necessary, yet not su¢cient, condition for low capital mobility to occur.
However, despite the rich harvest of empirical tests and advanced econo-
metrics there seems to remain a failure to recognize that current account
targeting and non perfect capital mobility are two sides of the same coin
and, therefore, the paradox just lies in the non perfect capital mobility issue,
that is what F-H showed. As a con…rm of this, there comes the Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (2000) test, on OECD data. For the most recent period avail-
able, i.e. 1990-1997, the coe¢cient is lower than in the original F-H test, but
remains ”larger than one might expect in a world of fully integrated capital
markets where global savings should ‡ow to the regions with the highest rate
of return.” (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000, p. 11).
An interesting result that could be considered a puzzle in the puzzle is the
one that concerns poorer countries. In both Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) and
Vamvakidis and Wacziarg (1998) it appears that the higher is the di¤erence
in average per capita income of countries, the weaker is the support for the
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F-H paradox. This represents a further puzzle since it seems that for less
developed countries current account discipline should be more severe than for
rich countries, because, as seen above, it costs more to run current account
de…cits.
Coming …nally back to Europe, the issue of capital mobility seems quite
relevant in the EMU. Capital ‡ows may be thought to be the most important
escape way to cope with asymmetric shocks in countries having no individual
monetary policy. Stirboeck and Heinemann (1999) …nd that capital mobility
in the EMU has increased as it appears from a lower level of the F-H coe¢-
cient they supplement with exchange rate variability prior to the introduction
of the euro.
This short introduction does not make any justice of the broad and rich lit-
erature, that has investigated both the theoretical aspects and the empirical
evidence 2 . We have just emphasized some of the most relevant conundrums
behind the still alive F-H puzzle.
However, it seems to us that there remains scope to analyze the F-H
puzzle in many ways and our contribution will try to provide some new
insights in both the empirical coverage and the de…nition of the variables
that are currently used.
As far as the empirical coverage is concerned, we go through the analysis
of the relationship between saving and investment in a highly integrated
area, i.e. Europe, by considering di¤erent degrees of proximity, i.e.: the
European Union (EU) with its present 15 members, the EU as it will appear
2For a recent survey see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 2000) and Coakley, Kulasi and
Smith (1998).
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in the second half of this decade, i.e.: the enlarged EU with inclusion of
some Eastern Europe countries, and …nally the pioneering group which has
given rise to the EMU. Notice that, within EMU, current account targeting is
loosing any rationale. In the next future we may then be able to see whether
the e¤ect of current account on capital mobility is there or not. Yet, we are
short of empirical support because the EMU started in 1999.
As far as the de…nition of the variable is concerned, we introduce some
novelty for the investment. So far, in all tests of the F-H puzzle the invest-
ment variable includes both investments undertaken by residents and foreign
direct investments (FDI). However, FDI should not be explained by the sav-
ing of the recipient country. Foreigners are responsible for FDI and they
should not be driven by the level of saving available in the host country. On
the contrary, this may be reasonable only if an increase in saving signals a
faster productivity path, that is going to attract more FDI. Moreover, FDI
are not limited by the intertemporal current account constraint of the recip-
ient country, since they remain the property of foreigners who are subject
only to their own (domestic) budget constraint.
We …nally introduce exchange rate variability into the picture. We think
that the higher the volatility of the exchange rate (ER) of a country the higher
is the variability of its current account. This should make for a stronger dis-
cipline and therefore reinforce the dependence of investment on saving, while
decreasing investment as the exchange rate variability increases. Therefore
the coe¢cient of retention should increase as ER variability somehow raises
the degree of insulation of the domestic capital market.
In the next section we shall provide some new speci…cation of the F-H
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puzzle without FDI. In section 3 we present the results of the econometric
tests. In section 4 we consider the e¤ect of exchange rate volatility, while in
section 5 we draw some conclusions.
2 The exclusion of FDI in the empirical spec-
i…cation
The purpose of this section is to go through the de…nition of the investment
variable used in almost all tests of the F-H puzzle. Our innovation concerns
the de…nition of investment. The common wisdom in these tests is to use
the investment in each country without subtracting FDI from the variable
adopted. It seems to us that this is not the proper investment variable. To
get the right investment, we should subtract from each …gure of domestic
investment the corresponding amount of net FDI in‡ow into the country.
The reason behind this alteration of the dependent variable concerns the
intertemporal budget costraint and/or current account discipline related to
FDI. If a USA citizen sets up a new …rm in Euroland the investment is
undertaken without any regard to the intertemporal budget constraint of
Euroland. The budget constraint is the one faced by the USA citizen who
remains the owner of the real asset in Euroland. This means that investment
should not be limited by the current account discipline that is faced by the
expenditure of any European representative agent. As a consequence we rule
out any causality going from internal saving to the net in‡ow of FDI. If we
use the standard de…nition of domestic investment without subtracting FDI
a F-H coe¢cient near to 1 is no sign of home biasedness of saving since part
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of the investment draws on external saving.
We adopt this novel approach in a test that replicates those undertaken
recently by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) and by Jansen (1997). Even though
the statistical measure of FDI is not accurate and subject to serious draw-
backs3 it seems to be more appropriate than the investment variable that
includes also FDI. A similar approach has been used recently on a narrower
data set on a panel (Rossini and Zanghieri, 2001). The outcome is a F-H
coe¢cient which is lower than both, the original one (and subsequent up-
dated contributions: Feldstein, 1983; Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1991) and the
coe¢cient that may be obtained on the same data set with the traditional
investment variable.
The econometric tests we present are performed with panel estimation on
groups of countries belonging to di¤erent areas.
The …rst area is represented by the EU made up of 14 countries (Luxem-
bourg is not considered since it is too small and plays the role of a kind of tax
heaven resort). In this area we expect that the degree of …nancial integra-
tion has increased quite substantially during the last two decades, gradually
weakening the dependency of investment on domestic saving.
The second area is termed ”pseudo EU” since we include Switzerland
and Norway. We add those two countries since they are quite integrated
with the rest of the Union, mainly from a …nancial point of view. Among
other thinghs, this is con…rmed by the ability of Norway to run huge current
3The statistical FDI de…nition includes also equity acquisitions by non residents. This
may decrease the reliability of the FDI data to describe genuine investment by non resi-
dents. See, for a de…nition of the FDI data, IMF (2000). We are not aware of any better
statistical speci…cation of FDI.
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account de…cits in the 1970’s and in the 1980’s drawing mostly on capitals
from European countries to …nance the development of North Sea oil drilling
plants. We expect in this area a higher F-H coe¢cient than in the authentic
EU since we include countries that are anyway less integrated with the EU
than the members of the EU among themselves.
The third area is the EMU. Here the level of …nancial integration may be
even larger. However, we should make a distinction between what we expect
after the introduction of the common currency, from 1999 onwards, and the
path countries had to follow to qualify for the club. Maastricht treaty im-
posed limits on current account de…cits (but not on surpluses) for qualifying
countries4. This discipline may have induced a severe current account tar-
geting in the years preceding the establishment of the EMU, phases 1 and
2 of the EMU, up to 1999, or even 2002, the year of the …nal stage of the
transition to the single currency. Now current account targeting has lost any
meaning and it remains just a historical record of a discipline that the single
currency makes redundant. Then our expectation is for a con…rmation of the
F-H puzzle for the 1990’s to a greater extent than in the past, while in the
…rst decade of the new millennium we shall probably see a reversal of that
within the EMU.
The fourth area is the enlarged EU, where we include some of the countries
that are likely to join the EU during the present decade. Tests for these
countries cover only part of the 1990’s since data for the years before the
beginning of the transition are meaningless.
4The Maastricht Treaty mentions ”sustainable balance of payments” (art. 3A) and the
pattern for quali…cation imposes a discipline on current account (art. 109, h, i, j).
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The relationship used in F-H style studies is:
(
I
Y
)i = ¯1(
S
Y
)i + "i (1)
where I is nominal investment, Y nominal GDP, S nominal saving and
"i is the error term. Subscript i refers to country. The relationship is tested
using …xed e¤ect panel estimation, considering both the entire time span and
shorter 5 year subsamples.
The new speci…cation, with FDI netting out, appears as5:
(
I ¡ FDI
Y
)i = ¯2(
S
Y
)i + ¹i: (2)
A further speci…cation was used to take into account the e¤ect on the
current account of exchange rates (ER) variability. This approach has al-
ready been partially used by Stirboeck and Heinemann (1999) and seems to
provide signi…cant results due to the further discipline that ER risk imposes
on current account and therefore on the saving investment relationship, im-
plying that ER variability makes for a close relationship between I and S:
To this purpose the speci…cation adopted is:
(
I
Y
)i = ¯3(
S
Y
)i + ¯4(
S
Y
XR)i + zi: (3)
where XRi stands for the variability of the exchange rate of country i;
measured by the annual standard deviation of monthly percentage change of
trade weighted exchange rate. XR is introduced interactively as a measure
of openess, as in the original Feldstein and Horioka (1980) contribution.
5FDI measure used is de…ned as net foreign direct investment in reporting country.
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3 The results
We use …xed e¤ect panel estimation with GLS in order to correct for het-
eroskedasticity and have consistent standard errors and covariances, for all
speci…cations (1), (2), and (3).
The analysis is conducted over several di¤erent time intervals due to
constraints on the availability of data.
3.1 Area 1: EU
We present the results in table 1 of speci…cation (1) and (2). Constants are
country speci…c and are not reported.
Table 1
¯1 ¯2
0.30 0.26
t¡ Stat 12.48 12.44
R2 .75 .73
We may consider the evolution of (1) over time. We cannot perform the
same exercise with the correction for FDI due to lack of consistent data.
The results are in table 2.
Table 2
¯1; 70-74 ¯1; 75-79 ¯1; 80-84 ¯1; 85-89 ¯1; 90-94 ¯1; 94-99
:37 :28 :37 :33 :72 :53
t¡ Stat 11:87 6:20 25:67 128:02 19:57 17:93
R2 :80 :75 :83 :84 :72 :95
3.2 Area 2: Pseudo EU
We replicate what done for area 1 and we then get, for the panel over 1991-
1997,
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Table 3
¯1 ¯2
0.34 0.25
t¡ Stat 18.13 13.67
R2 .72 .73
while for the evolution of (1) over time we get table 4.
Table 4
¯1; 70-74 ¯1; 75-79 ¯1; 80-84 ¯1; 85-89 ¯1; 90-94 ¯1; 94-99
:39 :31 :35 :33 :73 :52
t¡ Stat 11:50 7:06 28:02 29:75 24:14 20:70
R2 :82 :83 :85 :86 :74 :90
3.3 Area 3: EMU
Let us replicate the same exercise for the EMU and get:
Table 5
¯1 ¯2
0.33 0.27
t¡ Stat 21.72 17.50
R2 .69 .74
Table 6
¯1; 70-74 ¯1; 75-79 ¯1; 80-84 ¯1; 85-89 ¯1; 90-94 ¯1; 94-99
:65 :49 :32 :33 :42 :53
t¡ Stat 7:15 11:11 238:49 161:41 34:27 18:28
R2 :68 :66 :76 :88 :65 :92
3.4 Area 4. Enlarged EU
Again, the results for enlarged EU are:
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Table 7
¯1 ¯2
0.15 0.09
t¡ Stat 4.38 2.42
R2 .77 .81
Table 8
t¡ Stat
¯1; 90-94
:09
2:60
¯1; 94-99
:32
14:89
R2 :79 :89
From tables 1, 3, 5, 7 we notice that the level of the coe¢cient of saving
decreases as we go from the ”gross” investment to the ”net” domestic invest-
ment, i.e. without FDI. This means that the true F-H coe¢cient is lower
than in the usual tests. FDI seems to have a compensating e¤ect decreasing
the excess demand for saving.
When we go through the analysis of speci…c areas we discover that in
the EU the level of the F-H coe¢cient is rather low over the 1970’s and the
1980’s, while it increases quite substantially over the 1990’s, suggesting that
countries, in order to qualify for the euro club, were targeting the current
account. The di¤erence with respect to the EMU is quite relevant in the
1970’s and in the period 1990-94. The inclusion of countries opting out seems
to increase the coe¢cient as if they feared attacks on their currencies if they
did not target the current account, implying that staying out of EMU meant
even a stronger discipline on external account. A similar result appears for
the Pseudo EU.
As far as the enlarged EU is concerned we …nd that the F-H coe¢cients are
very low. With the ”net” investment speci…cation, over the period 1991-1998,
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the coe¢cient is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, as it is for the period
1990-94. This may be the sign that Eastern countries …nancial markets are
quite open and countries are able to invest without having to comply with
the strict constraint of domestic saving. This con…rms the results of Vam-
vakidis and Wacziarg (1998). This could also be the e¤ect of diversi…cation
of …nancial investments across countries of di¤erent levels of development.
The explanation goes as follows: for a rich country, it is more convenient
to diversify towards a developing country rather than to an economy at a
similar level of development whose economy is more cyclically correlated to
it.
4 The exchange rate volatility
The results obtained using speci…cation (3) are in table 9 below.
Table 9
¯3; 76-80 ¯3; 81-85 ¯3; 86-90 ¯3; 91-95 ¯3; 94-98 ¯3; 76-98
t¡ Stat
¡:4711
28:0383
:2735
52:4626
¡:1611
81:2909
:3953
22:8626
:5324
17:4356
:4553
18:4675
t¡ Stat
¯4;76¡80
1:0387
3:0193
¯4;81¡85
¡:2053
6:7513
¯4;86¡90
9:1371
344:8365
¯4;91¡95
¡:7997
8:5598
¯4;94¡98
¡:0090
0:0979
¯4;76¡98
¡:2399
1:2618
R2
It seems that the introduction of exchange rate variability upsets quite
strongly the F-H coe¢cient and in some cases it reverses the sign of it. We are
rather uncertain about the e¤ect of ER volatility on investment. We think
that a better speci…cation of ER variability is needed since the relationship
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between ER volatility, the current account and …nally investment doesn’t
appear robust.
5 Conclusions
We have gone through a test of the F-H paradox using a more cleaner measure
of domestic investment, i.e. by subtracting from it the net in‡ow of FDI. In all
cases examined it appears that the F-H coe¢cient becomes smaller. Then,
once the speci…cation of the dipendent variable becomes more precise the
comovements of saving and investment tend to become less important.
The test has been extended to various dimensions of Europe to assess
the extent of capital markets openess. When we consider the e¤ect of saving
across time and di¤erent European areas we …nd that the degree of capi-
tal mobility, that the F-H coe¢cient signals, seems to be fairly high in all
de…nition of the Europe (EMU, EU, pseudo EU and enlarged EU).
Surprisingly enough, the enlarged Europe shows a lower F-H coe¢cient
over the 1990’s, i.e.: pointing to a relevant capital mobility that is a good
premise for the ongoing integration of Eastern Europe with incumbent mem-
bers of the EU.
Interesting enough is a further e¤ect emerging out of the Maastricht dis-
cipline for the EU and the EMU in the …rst half of the 1990’s. Current
account targeting was a common policy, needed to qualify for the euro, that
made many countries loath to have quite diverse saving and investment lev-
els. We are looking forward to analysing the same relationships as from 1999
onwards, when data will be available, since the single currency should make
17
current account targeting at the national level meaningless in the EMU.
6 Data bases
First we de…ne the groups of countries belonging to EU, EU15 and Enlarged
EU.
1. Pseudo EU:
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden.
2. EU 14 = pseudo EU minus Switzerland and Norway.
3. EMU: EU 14 minus Denmark, UK, Sweden.
4. Enlarged EU: EU plus Czech republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia.
Data come from World Bank (2001) for saving, investment and GDP,
while data for exchange rates come from Datastream.
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